Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 9
Number 1 Volume 9, No. 1, Special Issue
Spring 2016: Designing Danger: Complex
Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors

Article 8

Digging Into Israel: The Sophisticated Tunneling Network of
Hamas
Nicole J. Watkins
RTI International, njwatkinsj@gmail.com

Alena M. James
Marymount University, ajames@marymount.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 84-103
Recommended Citation

Watkins, Nicole J. and James, Alena M.. "Digging Into Israel: The
Sophisticated Tunneling Network of Hamas." Journal of Strategic Security
9, no. 1 (2016) : 84-103.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1508
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/8
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Digging Into Israel: The Sophisticated Tunneling Network of
Hamas
Abstract
By the end of Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, the Israel Defense Force (IDF)
claimed to have discovered and destroyed more than 30 tunnels spanning from beneath
Gaza into Israeli territory. Hamas officials have praised these tunnels as an innovative
approach to fighting an asymmetric war with a far more conventionally powerful Israel.
The purpose of this case study is to examine the complexity of Hamas’ vast tunneling
network by assessing the motivations behind the group’s decision to construct the network,
to identify the factors that enabled Hamas to engage in such a complex engineering task,
and to assess the level of effectiveness of the tunnel network both strategically and
tactically against the IDF.
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Introduction
Underground tunnels have long been used in wartime as both an offensive
and defensive military strategy.1 The motivations underlying groups’ decision
to engage in tunnel warfare may vary, but oft cited reasons include the
inherent difficulty associated with finding subterranean structures, and the
convenient freedom of movement allowed to those who use them.2 The
purpose of this case study is to provide an exploratory look into why Hamas
(Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah—Islamic Resistance Movement3)
elected to engage in the complex engineering task of constructing a tunneling
network into Israel, to describe how this process likely played out, and to
assess the effectiveness of these tunnels as a strategy in Hamas’ ongoing
conflict with Israel. Using open sources, we argue that, whether intentional
or not, the tunnel network was a successful undertaking by the organization
in several regards: 1. the successful construction of the tunnels themselves,4 2.
the negative psychological impact the tunnels produced on Israeli citizens,
and 3. the (limited) success the tunnels have brought in allowing Hamas
militants entry into Israel. The following section describes the historical
context of tunneling and Hamas’ tunneling activity in Gaza. The Decision and
Implementation sections will examine the plausible factors leading to Hamas’
decision to engage in this complex engineering feat, and details of how the
tunnel network was most likely constructed. The Analysis section discusses
whether the group’s decision to construct tunnels was a successful
undertaking, while the Conclusion section offers some overarching remarks.

Allen D. Reece, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary
Perspective,” School of Advanced Military Studies, December 18, 1997: 1-63, available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a339626.pdf.
2 Ibid.
3 Levitt, Matthew, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 324.
4 For recent information on tunnel collapses during the first part of 2016, see: “Hamas
Operative Killed in Fourth Gaza Tunnel Collapse in Recent Weeks,” Jerusalem Post,
February 9, 2016, available at: http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Hamasoperative-killed-in-fourth-Gaza-tunnel-collapse-in-recent-weeks-444356.
1
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Context
Historical Use of Tunnel Warfare
Tunnels have long been used in times of conflict.5 The use of tunneling in
historical conflicts has stemmed from a desire and/or need to remain difficult
to detect.6 Perhaps one of the most familiar examples of tunnel warfare is the
Viet Cong’s use of underground tunnels during the Vietnam War. These
tunnels sometimes connected villages and homes, and were the underground
location for some public facilities, like hospitals.7 These subterranean
structures enabled the Viet Cong to evade the U.S. military and conduct
surprise attacks. Because they are inherently difficult to locate and target,
tunnels can provide a valuable defensive asset for groups that are capable of
constructing them. Upon their discovery, it is also difficult to accurately
assess the extent of tunnel networks without proper and specialized
equipment.8 This difficulty in developing an adequate and accurate
assessment of an opponent’s tunneling network impacts the destruction
process; this may not always be a straightforward task, as parts of a tunnel
may remain intact even if entrances are seemingly destroyed.9 The many
difficulties associated with locating, assessing, and fully destroying a tunnel
system, in conjunction with the historical precedence of tunneling in Gaza for
smuggling purposes, is likely to have influenced Hamas’ decision to construct
its own tunnel system into Israel.

Hamas’ Historical Use of Tunnels
In October 2013, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), acting upon information
received from an unidentified source, discovered a subterranean tunnel
leading from Gaza into Israeli territory.10 The tunnel, with a total length of
1,800 meters, stretched 300 meters into Israel, and was later claimed to be
the work of Hamas, the current governing organization in the Gaza strip and a

Donald M. Heilig, “Subterranean Warfare: A Counter to U.S. Airpower,” Air University,
April, 2000: 1-34, available at: http://www.specwar.info/taktika-strategie/podzemneoperacie-v-mestskom-prostredi/subterranean-warfare-a-counter-to-us-airpower.pdf.
6 Ibid.
7 Reece, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary Perspective.”
8 Heilig, “Subterranean Warfare: A Counter to U.S. Airpower.”
9 Ibid.
10 Gilli Cohen, “Where Did the Cement Come From? Leak Leads to Discovery of Megatunnel From Gaza to Israel,” October 23, 2013, available at:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.552162.
5
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U.S. Department of State-designated terrorist organization.11 It was later
discovered that this was just one of many tunnels credited to Hamas for
infiltrating the Israeli border.
Over the past decade, Hamas in Gaza and Israel have been involved in an
ever-increasing conflict, with 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, 2012’s Operation
Pillar of Defense, and 2014’s Operation Protective Edge marking periods of
direct, intensified attacks between the two groups. Throughout this time of
conflict, Hamas has ostensibly been building tunnels for the express purpose
of increasing its military operational capabilities against the IDF, though it
remains unclear if the tunnels are explicitly used more for offensive tactics or
defensive tactics. During the 50-day Operation Protective Edge specifically,
the destruction of this tunneling network beneath the Israeli border became
the key avowed motivation for Israel’s ground offensive.12 Through the course
of this operation, the IDF claimed it discovered more than 30 tunnels
extending into Israel.13
However, it should be recognized at the outset that not all tunnels within
Gaza are used for military operations, or even infiltrating Israel. Since the
1980s, smuggling tunnels routing from the Gaza Strip into Egypt have played
a substantial role in the livelihood of Palestinians by providing supplies and
employment opportunities for civilians in need of work.14 These smuggling
tunnels were constructed in response to blockades imposed on the Palestinian
territories by Egypt and Israel. Food, weapons, and other goods were and
continue to be illegally trafficked through these tunnels, playing a significant
role in Gaza’s economy by generating approximately $700 million per year.15
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, (Washington, D.C.: US
Department of State) available at:
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.html.
12 ICT Database Team, “Operation ‘Protective Edge’: A Detailed Summary of Events,”
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, July 12, 2014, available at:
http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1262/Operation-Protective-Edge-A-Detailed-Summaryof-Events.
13 Anti-defamation League, “Operation Protective Edge: July-August 2014,” 2015,
available at: http://www.adl.org/israel-international/israel-middleeast/content/AG/operation-protective-edge.html.
14 Shlomi Eldar, “Gaza tunnels take IDF by surprise,” Al-Monitor, July 20, 2014, available
at:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/israel-idf-tunnels-gaza-undergr
ound-network-failure-welfare.html.
15 Hayes Brown, “What You Need To Know About The Tunnels That Bring Life — And
Death — Into Gaza,” Think Progress, July 2014, available at:
11
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Known also as “economic tunnels,” more than 1,000 are thought to have been
dug beneath the border between Egypt and Gaza under the authority mainly
of Hamas, who took over the territory from Fatah in 2007.16 As detailed more
fully below, Palestinians’ and Hamas’ historical experience in engineering and
operating smuggling tunnels is likely a leading factor contributing to Hamas’
decision to dig and construct its tunnel network into Israel.
Although smuggling tunnels have been used since the late 1980s, it is unclear
exactly how long operational tunnels have existed beneath the Gaza/Israeli
border.17 The first smuggling tunnel discovery by Israel occurred in 1983;18
however it is believed that the use of the tunnels for military operations (such
as the tunnel discovered in October 2013) only really began during the alAqsa Intifada (beginning in September 2000), with tunnel development
expanding immensely after Hamas took control of Gaza.19 Following Hamas’
takeover of Gaza, the makeshift tunnels dug by Fatah during the al-Aqsa
Intifada fell under the authority of Hamas’ military arm, the Al-Qassam
Brigades. It is believed that they were transformed by the Al-Qassam
Brigades into what have been called “Gaza’s longest, deepest, and most
sophisticated tunnels” by Israeli engineers.20 According to some
commentators, many of the more advanced tunnels were constructed
following the 2012 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, when
Israel agreed to lift trade bans to allow humanitarian assistance to enter Gaza.
It is at this point that the newly uninhibited flow of steel and concrete,
intended for the building of above-ground infrastructure in Gaza, may have
made the creation of the more sophisticated tunnels possible.21

http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/07/18/3461742/inside-the-tunnels-that-bringlife-and-death-into-gaza/a.
16Karl Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally,” Time, March
26, 2014, available at: http://time.com/38627/hamas-gaza-tunnels-israel/.
17 Ibid.
18 Nicholas Pelham, “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: the Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s
Siege,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41:4 (2011/2012).
19 Shabak.gov, 2008, available at:
http://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/hamas-tunnel-report.aspx.
20 Pelham, “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon.”
21 Ariel Ben Solomon, “Exclusive: US Intelligence source claims Hamas has many more
tunnels than Israel says,” Mabat USA, July 25, 2014, available at:
http://mabatusa.com/evan/exclusive-us-intelligence-source-claims-hamas-has-manymore-tunnels-than-israel-says-by-ariel-ben-solomon/.
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The operational tunnels potentially serve many purposes, including the
transfer and storage of weapons,22 facilitating border crossings (below the
security fence that Israel installed to prevent infiltration), as well as
functioning defensively as safety corridors for top leaders in the organization,
affording them and their families mobility and sanctuary.23 In addition, some
tunnel networks are designed to serve as “war-rooms,” or underground
bunkers in which leaders convene during times of emergency. Another
feature of the operational tunnels is that they are able to serve as covert
launching pads for rockets targeting Israel. Rocket launchers may be situated
at designated tunnel openings to mitigate detection by Israeli surveillance.
After a rocket launch, tunnel openings may be re-sealed by Al-Qassam
militants to prevent the IDF from detecting the tunnel’s location.24 Though it
is unclear whether Hamas uses these launch pads from underground within
Gaza or within Israel, it seems likely that the group would conduct these
attacks from openings within Israel to maximize the potential damage caused
by their mostly short-range (i.e. Qassam) rockets. Despite these many
purposes, covert infiltration of Hamas fighters into Israel remains, according
to many commentators, the key function of the operational tunnels.

Decision
Several factors are likely to have motivated Hamas’ decision making in
digging an extensive tunnel network into Israel. For instance, the decision
might be noted as one of many responses to Israel’s military superiority to
compensate for a perceived power imbalance. According to one Hamas
commander, Abu Laith, the 2008 air strikes and air surveillance conducted by
Israeli forces during Operation Cast Lead cost the group significantly,
spurring it to dig operational tunnels into Israeli territory as a way of moving

Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas fighters show defiance in Gaza tunnel tour,”
Reuters, August 19, 2014 available at:
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0GJ1HS20140819.
23 Shane Harris, “Extensive Hamas Tunnel Network Points to Israeli Intelligence Failure,”
Foreign Policy, July 31, 2014, available at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/31/extensive-hamas-tunnel-network-points-toisraeli-intelligence-failure/.
24 Jonathan Halevi, “Hamas’ Attack Tunnels: Analysis and Initial Implications,”
Jesusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 22, 2014, available at: http://jcpa.org/hamasattack-tunnels/.
22
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the battle underground.25,26 Reaching depths of at least 30 feet, the tunnels
enable Hamas militants to evade detection and provide covert storage of the
groups’ weaponry and equipment, demonstrating the defensive advantage in
tunneling. A dominant narrative that seems to underlie the group’s decision
to construct these resource-intensive tunnels is this power imbalance between
Hamas and the IDF. This decision to engage in tunnel construction is often
justified by Hamas specifically as a means of leveling the playing field.
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal described the motivation behind the
construction of the tunnel network as a response to Israel’s greater military
capabilities: “In light of the balance of power which shifted towards Israel, we
had to be creative in finding innovative ways. The tunnels were one of our
innovations. As they say, necessity is the mother of invention.”27 In addition,
at a March 2014 rally in Gaza, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh announced:
“The tunnels we are inaugurating today are the new Hamas strategy in
the war against Israel--the strategy of the tunnels. From belowground
and aboveground, you, the occupiers, will be dismissed. You have no
place in the land of Palestine...What the resistance forces are preparing
secretly for the next confrontation with Israel is beyond imagination
for Israel.”28
The tunnels have thus also been touted by Hamas leadership as the secret to
their successful attacks and their new strategic warfare.29 Indeed, a document
that was disseminated to other Palestinian factions, describing the purpose of
the tunnels, claimed that the tunnels would pose an unprecedented challenge

Rois Kais, “Hamas fighter: We have more weapons, can hit more Israeli cities,” Ynet
News, August 7, 2014, available at: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4555937,00.html.
26 Lazar Berman, “Tunnels still intact, say Hamas, Al-Jazeera,” The Times of Israel,
August 8, 2014, available at:
http://www.timesofisrael.com/tunnels-still-intact-say-hamas-commander-al-jazeera/.
27 Daniel Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making,” Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, available at: http://jcpa.org/hamas-tunnel-network/.
28 Maayan Lubell, “Tunnel attack fear turn Gaza border kibbutzim into a ghost town,”
Reuters, July 22, 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/uspalestinians-israel-tunnels-idUSKBN0FR1KV20140722.
29 Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.”
25
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to Israel. The document revealed the group’s intentions to deliver a surprise
attack that would leave Israel with limited opportunity to defend itself.30
However, the opportunity provided by Hamas’ prior experience constructing
smuggling tunnels is likely the lead motivating factor in the group’s decision
to construct tunnels for operational purposes. As described above, these
smuggling tunnels played a role in facilitating imports of fuel, vehicles,
weapons, explosives, rockets, and other strategic tools used by Hamas to fight
the IDF.31 However, they also at one time provided Hamas with strategic
positioning for attacking IDF operation centers situated within Gaza. Before
Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005, there were several reported instances of
attacks on the IDF carried out by planting explosive devices in tunnels
situated beneath IDF positions.32 The detonation of an explosive device
planted beneath an IDF base in 2001 resulted in injury to three IDF soldiers.
Another instance where explosives were planted underneath IDF positions
resulted in the death of one IDF soldier and injured five others.33 Scenarios
such as these possibly served as the genesis for the decision to use tunnels
extending from Gaza into Israel.
Finally, there has been some suggestion that one motivation for the
development of the tunnels system stems from the desire to provide work for
the movement’s thousands of armed men who have nothing to do when not
fighting. According to Shlomi Eldar, a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Israel
Pulse, digging tunnels provides an operational occupation for thousands of
Hamas members with a strong desire to fight.34 Digging tunnels thus
provides these men with a distraction and hope that their ability to conduct
operations against Israel will be enhanced in the future.35

Organization
Adnan Abu Amer, “Tunnel May Signal Shift in Hamas-Israel Conflict,” Al-Monitor,
October 22, 2013, available at: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/gaza-tunnel-israel-shift-hamas-war.html#.
31 Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making..
32 Terrence McCoy, “How Hamas uses its tunnels to kill and capture Israeli soldiers,” July
21, 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/07/21/how-hamas-uses-its-tunnels-to-kill-and-capture-israeli-soldiers/.
33 Rubenstein, “Hamas’ tunnel network: A massacre in the making.”
34 Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas Spends Downtime Digging Tunnels,” Al-Monitor, October 15,
2013, available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/hamas-gazatunnels-israel-jihad.html.
35 Ibid.
30
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The identities of the key figures in charge of making the decision to embark
on the tunnel construction as an operational strategy against Israel are not
definitively known. This is largely due to the complex leadership structure
and decision making within Hamas. The ultimate authority to decide the
broader agenda of the movement ostensibly belongs to the Shura Council
within Hamas, the leadership body at the apex of the organizational chain of
command.36 However, day-to-day operations by the group fall within the
scope of the political bureau within Hamas, with military operations more
specifically falling within the scope of the group’s military wing, the AlQassam Brigades. While some have claimed that there is no single leader
within the movement who makes all decisions, it has been acknowledged that
the Al-Qassam Brigades have a high degree of autonomy to operate and carry
out missions as they see fit.37 Indeed, despite the ambiguity regarding the
group’s leadership structure, some experts claim that the decision to
implement the tunnel strategy was pushed by Mohammed Deif, the current
head of the Al-Qassam Brigades.38 It is thus suspected that the tunnels are
constructed, maintained, and operated by the members of the Al-Qassam
Brigades. Some fighters have even described these tunnels as being
synonymous with their own homes, as they built the tunnels “with their own
hands.”39
This indoctrination of Al-Qassam militants with respect to Hamas’ mission of
engaging in tunnel warfare might provide a certain degree of risk tolerance for
the organization in this regard. Hamas takes a significant risk of
disenchanting their militants and alienating the Gazan people with their
tunnel strategy, as Israel’s response to Hamas attacks has often resulted in
many thousands of casualties, including civilians, as well as widespread
destruction of infrastructure within Gaza. Furthermore, tunnel construction
has been acknowledged as a highly dangerous job, with casualties resulting

Bertie, Benedetta, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration,
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
37 Hroub, Khaled, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, (London: Pluto Press, 2010).
38 “Deep underground, Mohammed Deif shapes Hamas war with Israel” The Jordan
Times, August 14, 2014, available at: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/deepunderground-mohammed-deif-shapes-hamas-war-israel.
39 Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas fighters show defiance in Gaza tunnel tour.”
36
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from cave-ins being not uncommon.40,41 Therefore, the dedication towards the
overarching cause remains an important factor in whether and how resilient
Hamas can be—as it is the Al-Qassam militants who perform the tunnel
construction and carry out the attacks through the tunnels. As evidenced by
reports of Hamas resuming its tunnel digging immediately following
Operation Protective Edge,42 its leaders seem willing to accept the risks
associated with the tunnel program.

Implementation
As noted above, though not officially identified, the individuals responsible
for implementing the tunnel network are believed to be Mohammed Deif, the
current leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, as well as (formerly) Ahmed alJaabari, the former operational head of the Brigades who was killed by IDF
forces in 2012.43 Given the degree of complexity involved in coordinating
such an operation, it is likely that the effort has had many members involved
in the planning and execution process. While much of the implementation
process mirrored that of the smuggling tunnels, some sources note other
influences on the development of the tunnel system into Israel, namely those
tracing back to influences stemming from Hezbollah, Iran, and North Korea.44
Resources from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also reportedly
aided Hamas in the funding and the construction of tunnels.45
The implementation of this complex project requires many types of technical
expertise, likely including individuals with specialized knowledge in structural
engineering, geology, electrical engineering, and mining. There is insufficient
information to state with any certainty whether the organization sought out
specific expertise to inform its attack tunneling efforts or whether it acquired
40Xinhua,

“Tunnel cave-in kills five Hamas militants in Gaza: security officials,”
Globaltimes, June 19, 2014, available at:
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/866651.shtml.
41 “Hamas Operative Killed in Fourth Gaza Tunnel Collapse in Recent Weeks.”
42 Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas focuses on rebuilding tunnels as Gazans Suffer,” Almonitor,
March 5, 2015, available at: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/hamas-digging-tunnels-attack-israel-blockadegaza-strip.html.
43 “Deep underground, Mohammed Deif shapes Hamas war with Israel.”; “Ahmed
Jaabari: elusive Hamas military chief,” The Jordan Times, November 14, 2012, available
at: http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/ahmed-jaabari-elusive-hamas-militarychief.
44 Halevi, “Hamas’ Attack Tunnels: Analysis and Initial Implications.”
45 Ibid.
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the expertise via an iterative process of trial and error. However, one
individual, Akram Juda, was designated by Israel as Hamas’ lead electrical
and mechanical engineer. Juda was indicted by Israel, which held him
responsible for the assembly of engines for drills, assembly of weapons such
as rockets and bombs, for rectifying electrical issues, and solving additional
engineering complications within the attack tunnels. According to his
indictment in 2009, a Hamas commander offered him to work on electricity
in the tunnel network, paying him $300 a month.46
Although the number of states supporting Hamas’ combat operations remains
limited, Hamas’ tunnel engineering task has likely been greatly influenced by
Hezbollah and Iran. In the period leading up to the Second Lebanon War,
which lasted from July 12, 2006 through August 14, 2006, Iran provided
guidance to Hezbollah to assist in its development of subterranean tunnels to
gain leverage against Israel.47 North Korea also assisted Hezbollah by
providing engineers to aid with the planning and creation of the tunnels. The
attack tunnels that exist beneath the Gaza strip appear to reflect the same
sophistication and ingenuity as those constructed by Hezbollah under
southern Lebanon. The collaboration among these actors with respect to
tunnel construction was likely driven by the same factors underlying their
general collaboration–the common objective of undermining Israel (in this
case, quite literally). Although past collaborations among these actors are
believed to have provided Hamas with influential assistance in taking on its
attack tunnel engineering tasks, Hamas’ failure to support Bashar Al-Assad in
the Syrian Civil War (March 2011 to Present) resulted in some distancing
between Hamas and Hezbollah / Iran.48 Despite the differences in their

Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel indicts Hamas tunnel engineer,” The Jerusalem Post,
November 11, 2014, available at: http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israelindicts-Hamas-tunnel-engineer-381466.
47 Emily Harris, “The Long History of the Gaza Tunnels,” NPR, July 26, 2014, available at:
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/07/26/335332220/the-long-history-ofthe-gaza-tunnels.
48 Mariam Karouny, “Hamas calls on Hezbollah to unite fight against Israel,” Al Arabiya
News, January 22, 2015, available at:
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/22/Hamas-calls-onHezbollah-to-unite-fight-against-Israel.html; Con Coughlin, “Iran Rekindles Relations
with Hamas,” The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2015, available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-rekindles-relations-with-hamas-1429658562.
46
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positions on supporting Al-Assad, Hamas appears to have recently improved
relations with Iran49 and is still seeking to improve relations with Hezbollah.50

Security
An important part of any complex engineering endeavor is to ensure the
safety and security of those who are implementing the project and the project
itself. The precise safety measures, if any, applied to those constructing the
tunnels is difficult to ascertain from open sources. However, it may be
reasonable to assume that Hamas incorporated some safety regulations to
protect its tunnel workers, as members tasked with tunnel digging are held in
very high esteem within the organization. The group seems to take significant
precautions to conceal the locations of the tunnels and to thwart IDF
intelligence gathering. Tunnels are strictly supervised by Hamas members,
and civilians are kept at a great distance from the sites.51 To ensure that
tunnel workers did not record any aspects of tunnel work, Hamas conducts
strip searches for recording devices.52 Some diggers are instructed to cover
their faces and use code names. These security measures were enacted to
reduce the risk of diggers acquiring information that could be shared with
Israel. Some sources have also indicated that tunnel workers may have been
executed to prevent intelligence leaks to Israel.53

Digging Process
The need for security remains perhaps one of the most critical underlying
differences between the development of previous smuggling tunnels and the
tunnels constructed for military operations. There is an imperative to remain
inconspicuous and complete the work undetected by the IDF so as to
maximize the potential use of the tunnels. During Operation Protective Edge,
Karouny, “Hamas calls on Hezbollah to unite fight against Israel.”
“Losing Ground in Arab World, Hamas Seeking Iranian Support and New Front
Against Israel,” The Tower, February 19, 2015, available at:
http://www.thetower.org/1643oc-losing-ground-in-arab-world-hamas-seekingiranian-support-and-new-front-against-israel/.
51Marissa Newman, “Hamas said to have executed dozens of tunnel diggers,” The Times
of Israel, August 11, 2014, available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-said-tohave-executed-dozens-of-tunneldiggers/?fb_comment_id=754502417921880_755631041142351#f1d7925a8c.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
49

50
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for example, Israel deployed drone surveillance over Gaza for the purpose of
keeping a watchful eye for tunnel diggers and, consequently, tunnels.54 To
offset the general risk posed by Israel’s comprehensive surveillance, Hamas
operatives have taken measures to ensure the sites of tunnel entrances were
inconspicuous, and that the excavation process was done as subtly as
possible. This need for clandestine operations translated to the group’s use of
excavation tools that make little noise relative to high-powered machines with
loud engines. 55,56 Tunnel diggers mainly use their hands in the digging
process, 57 only wielding electric or pneumatic jackhammers to break through
hard rock or solidly packed dirt.58,59 Most of the digging is done in softer soil
or sand, using shovels.60 Diggers take pains to excavate the dirt as
inconspicuously as possible, often removing the sand in boxes or bags slowly
to mitigate the potential for detection.61 As diggers progress through the
tunnel, removing dirt and rock, the sides and ceiling are reinforced by
concrete panels produced near the location of the dig sites.
The total cost of excavating the tunnels has been estimated to have claimed
about forty percent of Hamas’ total budget since construction began.62 Where
each tunnel is estimated to have cost about $60,000 to $200,000 to construct
initially, the total cost of excavating and maintaining the tunnels is estimated
to cost approximately $1 million each.63 Though very costly to maintain, the
Jonathon Cook, “Life and Death Under Israel’s Drones,” Al-Jazeera, Nov 28, 2013,
available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/gaza-life-deathunder-israel-drones-20131125124214350423.html.
55 Jack Khoury, “Hamas shows off tunnel-digging unit,” Haaretz, Nov 17, 2013, available
at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.558568.
56 Felice Friedson, “The tunnel trap,” Kuwait Times, Aug 11, 2014, available at:
http://news.kuwaittimes.net/pdf/2014/aug/11/p06.pdf.
57 Khoury, “Hamas shows off tunnel-digging unit.”
58 Mitch Ginsburg, “How Hamas Dug its Gaza ‘Terror Tunnel’ and How the IDF Found
it,” The Times of Israel, October 16, 2013, available at:
http://www.timesofisrael.com/how-the-tunnels-in-gaza-are-dug-and-detected/.
59 Tom Cohen, “CNN's Wolf Blitzer goes into a Hamas tunnel,” CNN, July 30, 2015,
available at: http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/28/world/meast/israel-gaza-tunnelswolf/index.html. According to a deputy commander for the Israeli Southern Gaza
Brigade, Hamas obtains the requisite electricity from Israel to power the jackhammers
and lighting used during the excavation process.
60 Khoury, “Hamas shows off tunnel-digging unit.”
61 Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.”
62 Elhanan Miller, “From tunnels to R160s, a primer on Hamas and its deadly
capabilities,” The Times of Israel, July 31, 2014, available at:
http://www.timesofisrael.com/from-tunnels-to-r-160s-a-primer-on-hamas-and-its-de
adly-capabilities/.
63 Abu Amer, “Tunnel May Signal Shift in Hamas-Israel Conflict.”
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group’s rapid resumption of tunnel building activity directly following
Operation Protective Edge appears to indicate that the organization has
sufficient financial resources to both construct tunnels and recover from
losses caused by Israeli attacks.
Sources suggest that between five and seven militants are involved in the
actual digging process at a time.64 These individuals are able to stay
underground for significant lengths of time due to certain provisions they are
afforded. Often, the tunnels are packed with sufficient amounts of food and
water so that the diggers are able to work uninterrupted for extended periods
of time. Some reports about the tunnels noted the presence of several
months’ worth of food and provisions.65 The tunnel diggers are considered to
be elite members of the Al-Qassam Brigades, and are viewed as “members of
a profession.”66 They most likely are drawn from the Engineering Unit of the
Qassam Brigades, the arm that is charged with constructing the tunnels used
in military operations.67 Due to the dangers associated with their job, tunnel
diggers are generously compensated by the organization.68 Barring any
disasters during the digging process, such as collapses, diggers are able to
advance an average of approximately four to five meters a day69 and can
complete an operational tunnel in nine to ten months,70 though tunnels have
been found that have taken upwards of two years to construct.71

Tunnel Characteristics
Hamas’ operational tunnels consist of a single main shaft, connected to
multiple offshoots that lead elsewhere in Gaza, or that spawn different exits
into Israel to facilitate the group’s surprise attacks from different locations.
The tunnels themselves typically begin from an inconspicuous location in

Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.”
McCoy, “How Hamas uses its tunnels to kill and capture Israeli soldiers.”
66 Yaakov Lappin, “Analysis: The hidden picture in Gaza,” The Jerusalem Post, July 31,
2014, available at: http://www.jpost.com/landedpages/printarticle.aspx?id=369501.
67 “The 'Izz AlDin AlQassam Brigades' Weapons And Units,” The Middle East Media
Research Institute, September 2, 2014, available at:
http://www.memri.org/report/en/print8132.htm.
68 Jack Khoury, “Hamas Says it Has Resumed Digging Tunnels Throughout Gaza”,
Haaretz, October 19, 2014, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-1.621706.
69 Miller, “From tunnels to R160s, a primer on Hamas and its deadly capabilities.”
70 Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.”
71 Ibid.
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Gaza, a few hundred meters from the border with Israel.72 Typically, these are
civilian structures, such as a chicken coop or the home of individuals who are
paid by Hamas. During Operation Protective Edge, the IDF reported that all
of the tunnels that they located and destroyed began within buildings.73
Hamas may build from or near civilian infrastructure because of Israel’s
reticence to deploy air strikes on civilian locations. However, even the
entrances that are located outside and not within these structures are difficult
to find, the search for them having been equated by IDF officials as trying to
locate a “needle in a haystack.”74 Tunnel entrances have been described as
“tiny,” with openings less than one meter in width, which probably aids in this
camouflage.75
The main shaft of the tunnel may be reached by descending ladders extending
from the opening, or by foot. Tunnels vary in depth and length, but some of
the tunnels that have been found by IDF forces during Operation Protective
Edge were reported to range from depths of about forty-five feet to one
hundred feet underground.76 Tunnels that are dug to depths closer to the one
hundred feet range are typically done so in response to the threat of detection
that is posed by sonar devices.77
The ceilings of the tunnels are normally tall enough to allow soldiers to walk
through with a slightly stooped posture,78 though some areas of the tunnel are
raised enough to allow for walking while fully erect.79 Additionally, the
tunnels are reported to be wide enough for militants to walk through, singlefile. While these tunnels are equipped with light sources throughout,
enabling militants to see for some distance ahead, visibility tends to be
Ibid.
John Batchelor, “Hamas’ attack tunnels are transforming war with Israel,” Al-Jazeera,
July 29, 2014, available at: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/gazatunnels-hamasisraelidf.html.
74 Harriet Sherwood, “Inside the tunnels Hamas built: Israel's struggle against new tactic
in Gaza war,” The Guardian, August 2, 2014, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/tunnels-hamas-israel-struggle-gaz
a-war.
75 Halevi, “Hamas’ Attack Tunnels: Analysis and Initial Implications.”
76 Ibid.; Friedson, “The tunnel trap.”; Alan Dershowitz,”Terror Tunnels: The Case for
Israel's Just War Against Hamas”, Gatestone Institute, September 12, 2014, available at:
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4695/hamas-terror-tunnels.
77 Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’ Hidden Economy”, The LA Times, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamass-hidden-economy.
78 Friedson, “The tunnel trap.”
79 Cohen, “CNN's Wolf Blitzer goes into a Hamas tunnel.”
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somewhat limited by the ambient light.80 The interior provisions of the
tunnels often include things that facilitate the movement of heavy objects
(weaponry,81 abductees,82 or other materials), such as tracks, carts, and pulley
systems.83 The interior of the tunnels are also characterized by networks of
visible wires and cables that comprise electrical and communications
systems.84 Installing separate communication lines as opposed to using the
established cellular network is done because of the unreliable network
coverage that exists when operating at certain depths below ground, in
addition to the vulnerabilities to IDF intelligence that exist when using
cellular lines to communicate.85

Analysis
The purpose of this case study was to provide an exploratory look into why
Hamas chose to engage in the complex engineering task of constructing a
tunneling network into Israel, to describe the process of tunnel construction,
and to assess the effectiveness of these tunnels as a strategy in Hamas’
ongoing conflict with Israel. In line with other groups that have historically
used tunnels to engage in covert military operations (i.e. moving undetected
between locations, conducting surprise attacks, using underground facilities
as a storage point for both weapons and people), Hamas has taken up
tunneling under its enemy’s territory as a means of increasing its operational
capabilities. Up to this point, we have delineated several likely motivations
behind Hamas’ decision to engage in tunnel construction. Most prominent,
we think, is the historical precedence of tunneling, albeit for smuggling
purposes, in the Gaza strip. After examining the intricacies involved in the
actual construction process, the question that must be addressed next is
whether Hamas’ development of the tunnel network was successful for the
group in terms of both task execution and strategy. Drawing our conclusions
from the open-source literature, we propose that Hamas was successful in the
execution of the tunneling itself, and also that the group enjoyed strategic
success through the negative psychological impact instilled in Israeli citizens.
In terms of overall success conducting ground offensives and infiltration of
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82 Batchelor, “Hamas’ attack tunnels are transforming war with Israel.”
83 Cohen, “CNN's Wolf Blitzer goes into a Hamas tunnel.”
84 Sherwood, “Inside the tunnels Hamas built.”
85 Vick, “Hamas in Gaza takes war against Israel underground, literally.”
80
81

98

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1

Israeli territory (again, an ostensible goal of the tunnels), Hamas has enjoyed
less success.
1. Successful construction of tunnels—The use of tunnels in warfare has
proven to be a viable defensive tactic throughout history, especially
due to the difficulties associated with successful location and
assessment of scope. The above discussion has shown that
(notwithstanding some collapses), Hamas has been successful in
constructing and maintaining a multitude of tunnels. Moreover, even
if located, tunnel destruction could prove difficult, as there is no
guarantee that the tunnel would be fully destroyed. Some segments
may remain intact, even after detonating an explosive to trigger a
collapse. Following the IDF’s campaign to eliminate the tunnels
during Operation Protective Edge, Hamas claimed that the IDF’s
destruction of 30 tunnels was only a portion of the total number of
tunnels it constructed into Israel.86 Furthermore, it claimed that the
tunnels that were reportedly destroyed by IDF forces were not
completely destroyed, and that they were able to rebuild sections that
were collapsed.87 However, there is no guarantee that this information
is not the product of Hamas propaganda. Regardless of how many
tunnels Hamas has retained, the execution of the task of building
military tunnels should be regarded overall as successful, given that
the tunnels were well-equipped with the requisite technology and
weaponry that would turn a simple smuggling tunnel into an
operational tunnel for military purposes.
2. Negative psychological impact on Israeli citizens—One could also
argue that Hamas was successful in a less direct sense, specifically,
through the side effect of fear produced amongst Israeli citizens,
especially those living near the Gaza border.88 The discovery of the
Ari Yashar, “Hamas says IDF didn’t Destroy all Terror Tunnels,” Israel National News,
October 3, 2014, available at:
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/185778.
87 Hazem Balousha, “Undeterred by Closures, Hamas still boasts of Tunnel Advantage,”
Al-Monitor, February 8, 2016, available at: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/gaza-hamas-strategic-weapon-tunnels-againstisrael.html#.
88 Maayan Lubell, “Tunnel attack fear turn Gaza border kibbutzim into a ghost town,”
Reuters, July 22, 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/uspalestinians-israel-tunnels-idUSKBN0FR1KV20140722.
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complexity of the tunnel system has succeeded in raising great concern
in the IDF, and in Israeli citizens. Several sources portraying Israeli
civilians’ reactions to the discovery have suggested a negative
psychological impact resulting from fear of the tunnels, and of being
kidnapped.89 Indeed, one could relate prior research conducted on
fear of victimization and crime that suggests that perceived risk, and
not necessarily actual risk, is sufficient to affect individuals’ fear of
victimization.90 This notion was examined in a study conducted with
Israeli university students attending school in an area undergoing
constant rocket attacks in 2008. The study revealed that actual risk of
being victimized by rocket attacks was not necessarily a predictor of
taking precautionary safety actions. For instance, students who lived
within the attack zone generally had less concern about their personal
risk and taking precautionary actions than those who lived outside of
the attack zone.91 This supports the notion that, regardless of the
actual risk of being attacked, whether via missile attacks or tunnel
infiltrations, the perceived risk is sufficient to produce fear amongst a
populace, especially when supplemented with widespread Israeli (and
international) media coverage on the tunnels. Though we would be
remiss in equating fully the fear of victimization with actual
victimization, fear has been associated with a host of negative
outcomes, including detrimental effects on mental and physical health
and quality of life in general.92 Thus, the tunnels under the Israeli
border, and the uncertainty they bring with them in terms of location,
length, and number of openings, may potentially inflict much more
damage on Israel than any single ground attack on IDF posts could
achieve.
3. Limited success in ground offensives—The tunnels have been used by
militants in several successful operations against Israeli forces that
Jodi Rudoren, “Tunnels Lead Right into the Heart of Israeli Fear,” NY Times, Jul 28,
2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/middleeast/tunnelslead-right-to-heart-of-israeli-fear.html?_r=0.
90 Ferraro, KF, Fear of Crime, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).
91 Mosi Rosenboim, Uri Benzoin, Shosh Shahrabani, and Tal Shavit, “Emotions, Risk
Perceptions, and Precautionary Behavior Under the Terror Attacks: A Field Study Among
Israeli College Students,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25 (2012): 248-256.
92 Mai Stafford, Tarani Chandola, and Michael Marmot, “Association Between Fear of
Crime and Mental Health and Physical Functioning,” American Journal of Public Health,
97(11), (November 2007): 2076-2081.
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included the detonation of explosives beneath IDF positions in Gaza,
or small teams of Hamas militants leading surprise attacks on IDF
positions in Israel. However, these were limited in scope and impact.
Several July 2014 infiltrations near the Israeli villages of Sufa and NirAm and at Israeli security post Nahal Oz ended in the total deaths of 11
IDF soldiers, though Hamas experienced casualties as well.93 In
another incident in 2013, Hamas fighters disguised as members of the
IDF killed two soldiers after attacking an army patrol car.94 The
abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006 appears to be the most notable
instance of a successful operation led by Hamas using tunnels. In
June 2006, Hamas militants entered Israel via the underground
network and abducted Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier.95 In 2011, Shalit
was traded to Israel in an exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.96 A
senior Israeli intelligence official described the exchange as “one of the
most asymmetrical incidents in recent memory.”97
The evidence of successful attacks provided here may lead one to argue that
the tunnel network amounted to an overall operational failure due to the
limited number and scope of these attacks—i.e. the number of IDF members
killed or injured relative to the number of Hamas militants killed. One could
also argue that the number of Gaza civilians who were killed during each
response by the IDF, and the reinstatement of the blockade by Israel98 in
response to finding a tunnel system in October 2013, is further evidence of
this overall failure. Considered in such a purely rational calculus, the task of
tunneling was therefore not successful in meeting Hamas’ likely intended goal
of conducting effective ground offensives and potentially mimicking the
Jeffrey White, “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014,” CTC
Sentinel 7:9 (September, 2014): 9-13.
94 McCoy, “How Hamas uses its tunnels to kill and capture Israeli soldiers.”
95 Lee Glendinning, Warren Murray, Matthew Weaver, Haroon Siddique and Ben Quinn,
“Gilad Shalit exchange for Palestinian prisoners – as it happened,” The Guardian,
October 19, 2011, available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/oct/18/gilad-shalit-releasepalestinians-live.
96 Ibid.
97 Adam Ciralsky, “Did Israel Avert a Hamas Massacre?”, Vanity Fair, October 21, 2014,
available at: http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/10/gaza-tunnel-plotisraeli-intelligence.
98 Rasha Abou Jalal, “Cement Shortage in Gaza Leaves Thousands Jobless,” Al-Monitor,
March 3, 2014, available at: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/cement-blockade-siege-israel-egypt-gazaconstruction.html#.
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singular incident involving Gilad Shalit, as the heavy costs associated with
construction and IDF retaliation amount to more than the benefits realized by
using the tunnels for offensive and defensive purposes.
If not subscribing to a strict cost/benefit calculation, however, it can be
alternatively argued that the tunnel network was an operational success in
light of the power imbalance at the outset. The idea that Hamas was able to
carry out several successful ground offensives on IDF military posts and
inflict casualties of any number could be considered a success for the
organization and its larger cause, given the fact that the tunnel network was
never expected to meet Israel’s military force one to one. The idea that the
group has been able to cause what little damage it has may be even more
meaningful given the extensive resources that go into Israel’s maintaining a
very capable and sophisticated military operation,99 including substantial
resources devoted to locating and eliminating Hamas tunnels.

Conclusion
In this case study, we have set forth several reasons why Hamas may have
decided to construct a network of tunnels into Israel. We propose that the
decision was a culmination of several factors, but was mainly due to the
historical use and knowledge of building smuggling tunnels in Gaza. Despite
the limited success associated with the use of attack tunnels as an offensive
tool in its conflict with Israel, Hamas was very successful in the construction
of these advanced tunnels, and in consequently instilling a certain degree of
fear within its enemy. Structurally, the tunnels are well built and have
allowed Hamas to carry out several offensive operations against the IDF. The
idea that the group was able to inflict damage upon Israel, whether that be
physically, psychologically, or politically,100 could, in our view, be considered
a successful undertaking. Nevertheless, our analysis and conclusions must be
tempered by the fact that this study relies almost entirely on open-source
material, much of it stemming from Israeli sources. Taking this into
consideration, we propose that Hamas’ decision to construct these
operational tunnels, and the level of structural sophistication achieved,
For example, see Michael Martinez and Josh Levs, “How Iron Dome Blocks Rockets
From Gaza, Protects Israelis,” CNN, July 9, 2014, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/09/world/meast/israel-palestinians-iron-dome/.
100 “Israel to ‘Resist International Pressure’ Over Gaza,” BBC, July 12, 2014, available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28271546.
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certainly represents a successful effort, at least from the perspective of a
complex engineering task.
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